(CNN) — The Trump administration has tentatively agreed to allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium without enacting international safeguards intended to prevent nuclear weapons development, according to sources familiar with the matter and documents reviewed by CNN.
The draft nuclear accord that outlines US support for Riyadh’s civilian nuclear program is awaiting President Donald Trump’s signature despite US-Saudi negotiations concluding in October 2025.
Two sources familiar with the matter indicated that the ongoing war with Iran — which according to Trump was launched in part to prevent Tehran from using its enriched uranium to build nuclear weapons — has played a role in delaying Trump’s signature. Some on Capitol Hill also believe the Trump administration is delaying sign-off because it could face a bipartisan disapproval resolution blocking the deals from going into effect, said one of the sources.
Experts told CNN the deal could potentially provide Saudi Arabia with a path to nuclear weapons unless stringent safeguards are put in place. The country’s Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, has previously threatened to build his own nuclear weapons should Iran, his country’s principal regional rival, acquire the bomb.
Four sources said the agreement, which includes a civil nuclear cooperation deal known as a 123 agreement and a mandatory nuclear safeguards agreement, still have not been sent to Congress for review, as federal law requires the White House to do once signed.
The White House did not answer questions regarding the agreements and instead referred CNN to an October 2025 statement from Energy Secretary Chris Wright announcing the end of negotiations.
“We’ve come together on a deal for civil nuclear cooperation,” Wright said at the time. “Together, with bilateral safeguard agreements, we want to grow our partnership, bring American nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia and keep a firm commitment to nonproliferation.”
The Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, DC did not respond to a request for comment.
The Trump administration briefed some on Capitol Hill on the basic outlines of the Saudi nuclear accords earlier this year and even then, it was previewed as having a special arrangement allowing for a degree of domestic uranium enrichment and/or plutonium reprocessing, according to a source familiar with the matter. The source said that would be “unprecedented” for such a deal.
The uranium enrichment provision includes stipulations imposed by the US, two sources told CNN, but details of potential limitations are unclear.
The 123 agreement also will not provide the final word on whether Saudi Arabia gets sensitive technology and material.
The agreement is a baseline legal framework for US companies (or the government) to transfer nuclear material and technology to the recipient country’s civilian nuclear program. Those transfers are subject to additional review.
Uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing are the two main pathways to create the core material necessary to build nuclear weapons. Most countries whose civilian nuclear reactors require enriched uranium don’t produce it domestically — they instead purchase the material from vendors like the US or Russia and receive it in sealed shipments under strict international supervision.
But the draft agreement also does not require Saudi Arabia to adopt a standard enhanced nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, known as the Additional Protocol, according to a waiver submitted to Congress last year by the administration and a May State Department letter to lawmakers, both reviewed by CNN. Instead, the safeguards deal will be only between the US and the kingdom.
The IAEA is the UN’s nuclear watchdog agency, charged with preventing rogue nuclear weapons development by verifying countries’ commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT. The agency does so through methods such as monitoring technology, in-person inspections, and open-source analysis.
Safeguards
The administration, in its 2025 waiver report to Congress, said that the draft bilateral US-Saudi safeguards agreement “employs additional safeguards and verifications measures to the most proliferation-sensitive areas … enrichment, conversion, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing.” Without providing specific details, the waiver report said the IAEA would play a role in safeguarding the Saudi nuclear program and asserted that “the IAEA would have the necessary tools” for their work but would not have standardized IAEA oversight via the Additional Protocol.
Both the enrichment and reprocessing potential and the lack of enhanced IAEA commitment immediately raised concerns among many members on Capitol Hill, according to a source familiar. The Saudi deal stands in contrast to the 2009 agreement between the US and the United Arab Emirates, whereby the UAE agreed to the enhanced IAEA oversight and promised to forego enrichment and reprocessing. Nuclear experts refer to the UAE deal as the “gold standard” for nuclear cooperation.
“The Additional Protocol was explicitly designed to give the IAEA more access after it became clear that (basic) comprehensive safeguards agreements were insufficient” to prevent countries from progressing towards nuclear weapons, said Kelsey Davenport of the Arms Control Association.
Andrea Stricker, deputy director of nonproliferation work at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank, told CNN that now is not the moment to draw new standards.
“If you don’t have the Additional Protocol in place, then the IAEA would have fewer rights to go to (inspect suspected) undeclared sites,” said Stricker. “I think with rolling back the Iran enrichment problem, this is a prime opportunity to double down on the gold standard.”
Dan Joyner, a nuclear regulatory consultant and law professor at the University of Alabama, said he doesn’t see “the absence of an Additional Protocol as, by itself, cause for alarm.” He said that the US-Saudi bilateral agreement is “a reasonable way to supplement Saudi Arabia’s existing IAEA safeguards, though the adequacy … ultimately depends on its still-unpublished terms.”
Stricker said there is no safe way to permit enrichment or reprocessing on Saudi Arabia soil, though, even if such a facility were established under American control.
“You can’t be sure that the Saudis would not try to nationalize a facility,” she said. “Then the US president in power at the time would be faced with whether they would have to bomb the facility to try to prevent a breakout or something of that sort.”
Saudi technicians and scientists working on enrichment centrifuges could also apply their knowledge in other secret facilities, Stricker suggested. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program was launched in a similar manner after scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan is believed to have relied upon centrifuge blueprints from a European company who employed him to kickstart Pakistan’s program. Khan is believed to have also shared his knowledge with Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Pakistan maintains that Khan acted alone when selling the technology.
Joyner said he believes the benefits of Saudi peaceful nuclear cooperation outweigh “the existence of some residual proliferation risk.” One argument in favor of cooperation is that it would create a lucrative commercial market for America’s resurgent nuclear industry, which aligns with the Trump administration’s energy policy goals. Another is the risk that Russia or China would give the Saudis the terms they want with less effective safeguards.
The Arms Control Association’s Davenport cautioned, though, that establishing the precedent of “bespoke” nuclear safeguards arrangements could enable Russia and China to do the same with other countries.
“How would the United States feel if Russia started pushing its own bilateral safeguards in lieu of more intrusive IAEA standards?” she said.
Davis Winkie’s work at CNN is supported by a partnership between Outrider Foundation and Journalism Funding Partners (JFP). CNN retains full editorial control of the reporting.
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