(CNN) — For a war imposing such radical change on the battlefield, the retention of 60-year-old Oleksandr Syrskyi as Ukraine’s top commander had become an anomaly. That’s not ageism, but a reflection of the recently sacked Ukrainian military chief’s mindset.
In this light, President Volodymyr Zelensky’s decision Tuesday to replace Syrskyi with 43-year-old Mykhailo Drapatyi – a younger general from a newer generation of military leaders – seems perhaps overdue.
Syrskyi was a creature of the Soviet era, and brought to the first years of the war a dogged, brutal persistence, coupled with flourishes of strategic brilliance. He suited Ukraine’s initial need to match, and occasionally outwit, a larger, bloodier enemy. The defense of Kyiv in 2022, the rapid recapture of Kharkiv region later that year, and the sudden invasion of Kursk – Russia itself – in 2024, all are to his credit.
But his leadership was also marked by tremendous losses in Ukraine’s ranks. And ultimately, the same political infighting and naked ambition that led to his rise would lead to his downfall.
Syrskyi got the job after the 2023 counteroffensive failed, and the-then top commander, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, was moved to London as Ukraine’s ambassador. Many analysts suggest the failure stemmed from Syrskyi convincing Zelensky that a simultaneous push against the eastern city of Bakhmut and the Zaporizhzhia front in the south would split Russia’s defenses. Instead, it split the strength of Kyiv’s much vaunted summer push, which failed.
Syrskyi rose to the top also because Zaluzhnyi had perhaps become too popular, with his face often seen on military café walls; polls showed him wildly more liked than anyone else. And so, failure on the battlefield guaranteed his departure.
Fast forward two years, and a similar situation repeats itself: a clash on strategy flares up and leads Zelensky to – at first – dispense with a rising, popular star, 35-year-old Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov. The disrupter-in-chief, he had too openly sparred with Syrskyi about reform, and Zelensky – also too openly – had to admit he’d become the arbiter between the men. You can’t run a war like that, he said, quite correctly. The removal of Fedorov, a pioneer in technology and recruitment, sparked rare protests in Ukraine’s streets.
The week of melodrama followed a familiar pattern for Zelensky – reminiscent of a crisis a year ago over the fate of Ukraine’s anti-corruption bureau. Zelensky limited its powers, and then changed his mind, firing his chief of staff over corruption allegations, all because a protest movement had chipped away at his Teflon veneer. Zelensky seems to have learned almost nothing from that episode. And the repeat cycle – of action, protest, reaction – reveals two things about where Ukraine’s war is at now.
First, Ukraine’s military Tuesday underwent a generational shift. Syrskyi’s way of war – large frontal assaults that were costly, if not the only real way to reclaim land – had begun to look dated. Fedorov’s assault on the old ways – instead using robots, drones, automation, data to determine why troops were injured – all made sense in a country desperately short of troops. They put Ukraine at the global forefront of battlefield technology.
This new army was not Fedorov’s idea alone, but he had become its central proponent, and slowly the face of the victories it won: the headlines about robot rescues and assaults, and the relentless toll of Ukraine’s long-range strikes into Russia. The successes were those of Ukraine, but also of Fedorov, who trumpeted his decision to fund drone purchases earlier this year.
It is too early to tell if drones and robots truly can replace troops on the frontlines. Ukraine has little choice but to find out, and the time spent learning that lesson has provided Kyiv a useful pause to regroup, and a powerful technological upgrade that Moscow still has to match. War will never be the same again – until, that is, someone learns how to switch off the machines. Even now, some strategists argue, artillery retains a role in halting large-scale Russian advances. Not everything from the past is redundant overnight.
Yet Fedorov’s rise – the egos and jockeying aside – marked a simple shift: the younger Ukrainians who fight the war would be led by generals who are about the same age as them.
The new commander, Drapatyi, fought across the war’s toughest front lines, and video was even recycled on his appointment on Tuesday of him driving an armored personnel carrier through a pro-Russian separatist barricade in 2014. He is no novice, but he is not from Syrskyi’s generation. Eight years separate him and Fedorov, with his hacker mentality; 17 years separate him and Syrskyi, whose appetite for brutal assault units earned him the nickname, “the Butcher.”
Drapatyi gained similar experience to Syrskyi in the war, yet garnered a reputation for wins and reform. He was key to halting Russia’s initial invasion around the city of Kryvyi Rih, and then oversaw its rout from Kherson, but also stopped Russian advances later in Kharkiv region. He was an early champion of the use of drones to create a “kill zone” along the front line and effectively immobilize the Russian advance. His leadership of the land forces also saw a radical structural and leadership rethink.
Ukraine’s challenges do not vanish with this injection of relative youth to the top ranks. The country still lacks manpower, cash, and critical infrastructure to endure the next winter. But they have brought in new talent and retained a focus on new ideas and technology that had turned both the narrative of the war, and its dynamics, in their favor. In that sense,the past few days have been a small victory. Yet the episode provides another, less edifying lesson for Ukrainians.
The takeaway is that, politically, Zelensky dislikes the narrative slipping from his hands, almost as much as he dislikes parallel personalities garnering popularity. In hindsight, the entire incident was avoidable; Zelensky could have removed Syrskyi a week ago – as had seemed inevitable for months, as talk of his failings echoed around Kyiv. Instead, the public spat between the young Fedorov and older general led Zelensky to stick with the old, loyal guard.
Syrskyi had over the years proven himself the more capable political operator, and perhaps Zelensky feared the disruption in the established command his departure would provoke. Or was he more concerned that the young disruptor might have been seen to force upon him a key personnel change?
Zelensky’s instinct was to ditch the rising, popular star. Then the streets erupted with sizeable – but not massive – protests. And Zelensky began the slow, purposeful task of reversing course, with a series of public meetings with top military commanders – a sounding board, and auditions for a post that Syrskyi had clearly already lost.
It is unlikely Zelensky sought this protracted route to an outcome he could have expedited last week. Yet still, the spectacle of the enlightened president, listening to both the people, particularly the younger generation, and his military commanders, remains.
It is unclear what “prominent” role Fedorov has been offered in the government, or if he will accept it. That has become less the point: Zelensky has shown his Western allies and voters that he listens and can make disruptive change permanent. It is only really through changing the landscape of the fight that Kyiv can injure Moscow.
But one curiosity remains: Zelensky once said he would sit on the beach and drink a beer when the war ends. Indeed, it is hard to imagine why he would still want the country’s top job after the true, “just” peace he seeks takes hold. There is, in wartime Ukraine, no real mechanism to replace him, as valid elections are almost impossible. To that degree, he is invulnerable. Yet still he remains acutely obsessed with his popularity, to the extent that possible rivals, Zalyuzhnyi and Fedorov, are removed, despite their talents – and notably after they both clashed with Syrskyi.
Zelensky has been the consummate showman and salesman for Ukraine’s war effort in the international arena. But these glimpses of frailty at home betray a Bankova presidential headquarters where bad decisions – against corruption and Fedorov – are made quickly, and then slowly unpicked after popular pressure.
It is democracy in action, yes, but begs the question: How many other poor calls have gone unchallenged over the past four years?
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